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Special Obligations: The Structural Risks of Friendship
Abstract
Friendship is often conceived of as a freely chosen intrinsic good, yet friendship gives rise to special
obligations that can act against ethical regard for others. Philosophers who recognize the significance of
special obligations, such as Diane Jeske in Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Creates Reason,
argue that special obligations are an undeniable feature of friendship and give rise to conflicts between friends
and others to whom one has responsibilities. I argue that friendship can pose insoluble problems of special
obligation, not just because obligations to friends can conflict with other obligations we have, but because
friendship can challenge obligations we have to ourselves or to a conception of life that we hold precious. We
must accept this as a risk of friendship and regard such dissonance as a sign of strength in friendship as well as
a threat.
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Friendship is often conceived of as a freely chosen intrinsic good, yet friendship gives rise to 
special obligations that can act against ethical regard for others. Philosophers who recognize the 
significance of special obligations, such as Diane Jeske in Rationality and Moral Theory: How 
Intimacy Creates Reason, argue that special obligations are an undeniable feature of friendship 
and give rise to conflicts between friends and others to whom one has responsibilities. I argue 
that friendship can pose insoluble problems of special obligation, not just because obligations to 
friends can conflict with other obligations we have, but because friendship can challenge 
obligations we have to ourselves or to a conception of life that we hold precious. We must 
accept this as a risk of friendship and regard such dissonance as a sign of strength in friendship 
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I have never heard someone say “life would be so much better without friends” or “the 
last thing I need is a good friend.” As a chosen relationship, friendship is valued, and we 
naturally choose good things for ourselves over bad.  In the selection process, we test people in 
the role of our friend, and if we do not like a friend or a friend group, we leave to find another. 
In this paper, I discuss philosophical questions that arise in considering friendship and the 
special obligations they create: the kinds of friends we choose and why, the different challenges 
that arise in friendships, and the sometimes insoluble problems that friendships present.  I will 
argue that the special obligations found in close friendship involve great potential for conflict 
and challenging decisions that can threaten these friendships. Ultimately insoluble conflicts that 
arise from the special obligations that friendship creates can act as a catalyst for the decision to 
end a friendship for good. 
Of course our dear friendships are partnerships that we embrace because of the overall 
good that they bring to our lives, as they act as support, a source of understanding, escape, and 
a buffer for the challenges that life brings.  However, these positive goods do not eliminate the 
conflicts that friendships can present.  The difficulties we encounter in close friendships do not 
comprise mere arguments over where to go for dinner or catty exchanges. The darker and more 
dangerous side of friendship has a depth that philosophers rarely acknowledge.   
Why would it be that the friends whom we hold closest could bring such unhappiness?  
The danger of close friendship lies in the obligations we have to our friends, to others, and 
 
 
ourselves.  We face this danger when we are forced to choose between upholding one of two 
obligations: the obligation we have to our friends and giving them greatest priority, or the 
obligation we have to ourselves or to something else to which we are committed.  We will 
ultimately decide what obligation to uphold in order to paint the picture of the life we want to 















Chapter 1  Philosophers on Friendship 
In Book Eight of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes three types of friendship.  He 
regards two types, which he refers to as friendships of pleasure and of use, as lesser forms of 
friendship based on the extrinsic qualities that give rise to them.  Aristotle writes: “when the 
useful is the basis of affection, men love because of the good they get out of it, and when 
pleasure is the basis, for the pleasure they get out of it,” (Aristotle 218).  He admits that such 
friendship can be sturdy relationships, but does not consider them true friendships. They are 
not strong enough to carry them through all of the challenges that significant friendships can 
endure, nor reflect the shared concern for the good that Aristotle believes essential to true 
friendship.  Unlike in friendships of pleasure, the truest friendship, Aristotle believes, is 
between “…men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua 
good, and they are good themselves,” (Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics”). 
In a similar vein, the French Renaissance philosopher, Michel de Montaigne discusses 
acquaintances’ relationships with each other: “what we commonly call friends and friendships, 
are nothing but acquaintance and familiarities, either occasionally contracted, or upon some 
design, by means of which there happens some little intercourse betwixt our souls,” (Montaigne 
4).  Montaigne discusses some of the properties that can be applied to Aristotle’s friendships of 
use and pleasure and implies a shallowness about them, suggesting that these relationships 
may not be the closest friendships that we can obtain. 
 
 
Aristotle’s and Montaigne’s friendships of pleasure and use fall under the category of 
what might be termed casual friendships.  We cannot be equally committed to all of our friends, 
because we do not have enough time or energy to invest in the higher level of friendship by 
which significant friendships are categorized.  This is not to say that casual friendships are 
unnecessary in our lives; the relationships we have with casual and significant friends, though 
different, both have important purposes in our lives.   
Casual friendships of sheer use or pleasure are valuable to have in our lives as they are 
founded on convenience.  These types of friendships are more commonly found than closer 
ones, since there may be more opportunities to find such friends based on the fact that all is 
required of them is use or pleasure.  Friendships of use are very helpful in getting through life 
with the maximum amount of ease. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that this use will 
not fall under an emotional use but rather the use of a person as a resource or task provider.  
The convenience is emphasized more so in this relationship as the friendship does not 
necessarily have the happy component added onto it like the friendship of pleasure.  This type 
of friendship may exist between neighbors who watch each other’s houses while the other is out 
of town.  This dynamic is unique in its simplicity as they are friends because they both need 
things from each other and maybe nothing else.  Aristotle says: “such friends are not at all given 
to living in each other’s company, for sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant. 
Therefore they have no further need of this relationship if they are not mutually beneficial,” 
(Aristotle 219).  This common desire from the other enables us to refer to this relationship of 
need as another form of casual friendship. 
 
 
Friendships of pleasure are also very important in our lives.  They act similarly to those 
of use but what we need is less material and more emotional.  Such friends seek each other out 
to get pleasure out of an activity or situation rather than just the activity itself.  We seek these 
friends out because we enjoy engaging in a common interest with them.  This relationship of 
pleasure is more involved and personal than that of use but still extrinsic to the other person 
involved as it revolves around the common interest or activity.  An example of this is may be 
friendships that arise between people from clubs, or intramural sports, but remained confined 
to those activities.  While such relationships may seem to extend beyond a casual friendship of 
use, their friendship rests on an extrinsic quality of pleasure as the foundation of the 
relationship. 
Yet these casual friendships are important to us even though they lack a certain depth.  
Without these friendships we would miss pleasant interactions and would not have the 
privilege of gaining connections to new people and expanding our experiences.  These 
friendships can blossom from one of use and shared pleasure to a friendship that involves rarer, 
intrinsic qualities.  Intrinsic qualities include focusing on the friend for his or her own sake, 
independent of the activity in which we engage together.  It is at this deeper level that we begin 
to commit more of ourselves to our friendship and to the friend as an individual.  At this stage 
of friendship we are able to be more than we could be without such friendship. 
 Aristotle describes his perfect form of friendship, friendships of virtue, as deeper than 
those of use and pleasure.  He claims that “these friends wish alike for one another’s good 
 
 
because they are good men, and they are good per se, (that is, their goodness is something 
intrinsic, not incidental).  Those who wish for their friends’ good for their friends’ sake are 
friends in the truest sense,” (Aristotle 219).  The intrinsic component of the perfect friendship 
lies in the goodness that each person contains from the perspective of the other.  He believes 
that this virtue between friends adds a greater depth and assumes that these forms of 
friendships must be long-lasting because they are between good men, and good lasts forever.  
Aristotle views this intrinsic component of virtue between men as essential to good friendships; 
anyone who does not fit these qualifications cannot be considered a friend in the truest sense of 
the word.  
In Lysis, Plato also discusses intrinsic components as being essential to true friendships.  
He reasons through this by using a metaphor of a doctor, body, and disease, relating them as 
friends and enemies.  He says: “the body, which is neither good nor bad, is because of disease-
that is, because of what is bad-a friend of the medical art; and the medical art is a good. And the 
medical art has accepted the friendship for the sake of the health, and health is good,” (Plato 
44).  This metaphor carries great extrinsic qualities within it as Socrates points out: “if there is 
no disease [enemy], then a drug [friend] is not required…it is of no use itself for its own sake?” 
(Plato 47).  Socrates does not like this metaphor as he concludes that this would not be an 
example of a friend at all because it is not a friend for the friend’s sake. 
When we use Socrates’ perspective, we can see that seeking friendship for the sake of 
virtue and good is not as intrinsically focused on the friendship as it could be.  In order to 
 
 
address this flaw, he looks to desire as indication of intrinsic quality in a friend (Bolotin 49).  He 
reasons that if we desire to be with someone because of who they are and not what they do, 
such as for the sake of defeating evil or promoting good, then we are friends for intrinsic 
reasons; we are friends for the sake of being friends.  Ultimately, significant friendship is a 
product of the desire to be together for no specific reason beyond the friendship itself and the 
shared regard for the good in each other.   
While he never explicitly states this, Aristotle’s limitations of friendship only being 
accessible to good men implies that bad people are incapable of befriending others.  In Book 
Eight of Nicomachean Ethics, he writes: “The perfect form of friendship is that between good men 
who are alike in excellence and virtue,” (Aristotle, 219).  Aristotle believes that virtue is a 
necessity for the truest form of friendship and provides its foundation and most common 
between men, with the exception of husbands and wives.  He believes that the pairing of two 
virtuous souls allows for the most perfect friendship.  While these two “goods” could combine 
to achieve the “good” together, I disagree with Aristotle in regard to the forms of friendship he 
distinguishes and the limitations he puts on the friendship. 
 I do not believe that two men of perfectly good characters, free of vice, are the only 
people who can obtain a partnership such as true friendship.  The strongest kind of friendship is 
not the result only of two good men but a bond that makes possible a heightened good for each 
individual regardless of gender.  A lack of inherent virtue among individuals should not 
prevent people from reaching the strongest degree of friendship as long as a common good is 
 
 
embedded in the relationship of the two people.  This differs from Aristotle’s perspective, as he 
believes we must already be possessed of virtue at the start of a friendship, as if virtue is 
independent of the friendship itself. I view the good that arises from friendship as greater than 
two people can create on their own.   
 I share Aristotle’s belief, however, that friendship is rare.  Every friendship cannot reach 
such a high significance.  Aristotle states that good men cannot be true friends to every other 
good man: “to be friends with many people in the sense of perfect friendship is impossible…for 
love is like an extreme, and an extreme tends to be unique,” (Ostwald 225).  The highest degree 
of friendship discussed here will not be a commonality in one’s life, because significant 
friendships differ from casual friendships in their uniqueness.  These friendships are not as 
situational as casual friendships since the friendship is not founded on the context in which it 
exists. Significant friendships are founded on a deeper relationship of the character of each of 
the people involved -- beyond what they may enjoy doing together.  
In Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Essay on Friendship” (1841), Emerson claims that “when 
they [friends] are real, they are not glass threads or frostwork, but the solidest thing we know,” 
(Emerson 5).  For Emerson, friendship is one of the purest forms of relationship between two 
people.  He speaks of friends as entering a dyad in which they can only experience with the 
other person but not solely because of this other person. He explains that two people must 
remain individually sound and centered in a friendship. Emerson focuses on the intrinsic nature 
of friendship as key to individual growth.  In a world filled with ambiguity and unknown 
 
 
influences over our lives, the close friend acts as an anchor.  This suggests that we may turn to 
friendship for extrinsic reasons but it does not suggest that friendship exists without intrinsic 
reasons as well.  If it were solely an intrinsic relationship, then we could find ourselves 
absorbed in our friendship to the point that it became irrelevant to the rest of our lives. 
 What happens now that we know that we must seek intrinsic qualities in our closest and 
most significant friends?  Once we discover these qualities, the friendship has really just begun.  
When we reach that point of deep friendship and identifying each other as friends, we are ready 
to raise the expectations we have of our friends and consider them a higher priority.  We may 
experience a series of positive emotions as we further commit ourselves, yet this is the point in a 
friendship when there is greater risk. As soon as we ask more demanding obligations of one 
another, we are binding ourselves to a stronger commitment to the friendship from which risk, 
challenge, and conflict may arise. 
In The Politics of Friendship, Jacques Derrida conveys an idealized conception of the 
relationship between two people that aligns with which I argue to be the truest friendships.  
“The declaration would in truth be inscribed upon its act of birth. One loves only by declaring 
that one loves,” (Derrida 9).  While this declaration of friendship and true compatibility may 
seem overbearing, it is essential in initiating a significant friendship with someone.  Such 
moments as these, comprised of looks or words, are part of the movement of a friendship to a 
more committed stage. Moments like these are subjective, but they signify a great 
understanding of each other that can be differentiated from other casual friends.  Appreciation 
 
 
and mutuality may then be acknowledged for the friendship. If the friendship is not mutual, 
then the friendship may not be strong enough to uphold the risk and danger found in the 
special obligations of significant friendships. 
We can see signs of significant friendships in how people regard their friendship.  
Derrida says: “If a friend had to choose between knowing and being known, he would choose 
knowing rather than being known…One can love being loved, but loving will always be more, 
better and something other than being loved…one must first know how to love and know what 
loving means by loving,” (Derrida 11).  This desire to know our friend more than we want our 
friend to know us suggests the presence of intrinsic qualities we value in that friend.  Granted, 
we would like to be noticed mutually by our friend, but wanting to know the friend more than 
the friend knowing us is a strong indication of being in a significant friendship. We are then 
interested in the friend for their own sake, independent of ourselves, which is an essential 
component of significant friendships. 
 Derrida discusses how the future must be considered in the truest friendships as well.  
He explicates by referring to the friendship of the future as being in a state of “perhaps”: “to 
love friendship, it is not enough to know how to bear the other in the mourning; one must love 
the future. And there is no more just category for the future, and the perhaps to open on to the 
coming of what comes,” (Derrida 29).  He continues to say “perhaps” is not definite and 
embraces a sense of uncertainty that is necessary in a true friendship as it acts as a catalyst to 
discovering truth.  While this concept of uncertainty is inimical to Aristotle and Plato, it is 
 
 
essential to Derrida.  He believes that this uncertainty only originates in the truest forms of 
friendship.  The control we have when making decisions about future paths or courses we take 
in a friendship opens up a world of uncertainty and potential conflict. Our struggle in 
determining when to uphold our obligations to our friend suggests a dissonance that would not 
occur unless that friend held some sort of greater significance in our lives. 
 This struggle with conflicting obligations indicates when we begin to prioritize a person 
over other things and alongside already serious commitments in our lives.  This is the 
partnership of two people growing stronger together and getting closer to being one unit rather 
acting independently of each other.  Yet as we enter the realm of significant friendships, greater 
dilemmas arise.   
 As we approach close friendship, our friend becomes more valuable to us as our desire 
to choose them over others increases.  In a more casual friendship we may have been more 
interested in doing solely what benefits the friendship or even ourselves.  Due to the 
commitment and obligations that derive from significant friendships, we begin to consider what 
is good for them, even if that is not necessarily what is easy for the friendship.  Aristotle 
discusses this transference of obligations to a person versus to a friendship: “…in loving a 
friend they love their own good.  For when a good man becomes a friend he becomes a good to 
the person whose friend he is.  Thus, each partner both loves his own good and makes an equal 
return in the good he wishes for his partner and in the pleasure he gives him…friendship is said 
to be equality,” (Aristotle 224).  When people reach the level of true or virtuous friendship the 
 
 
obligation to a friend resembles the obligations we have to ourselves.  This commitment and 
application of obligation to our friend nearly matches our own in priority and can eventually 
pose problems of irreconcilable choice when such obligations conflict. 
 At this level of friendship, we may be harder on our friend than ever before because the 
degree of the obligation to our friend is similar to the degree of the obligations we have to 
ourselves.  The priority of our friend may even become a higher priority than the friendship.  It 
may seem paradoxical that the friendship becomes less important than the friend.  However, at 
this level of friendship, a new relationship has developed that contains an intimacy that was not 
there before.  This intimacy instills special obligations. 
As we reach higher and closer degrees of friendship, we extend the degree of obligations 
we undertake in that friendship.  In the most casual level of friendships, we consider obligations 
to ourselves and often act on what is in our best interest.  As we get closer to a friend we focus 
on our obligations to the friendship and act on ways to nurture the relationship itself.  As we 
reach the highest level of significance in friendship, we first prioritize our obligations to that 
friend with less consideration of the friendship itself, for a true friend will put the friend first 
before anything else because that is most important.   
Montaigne mentions close friendship as having this significant connection: “A unique 
and particular friendship dissolves all other obligations whatsoever: the secret I have sworn not 
to reveal to any other, I may without perjury communicate to him who is not another, but 
myself,” (Montaigne 6).  This level of commitment to the friend is apparent and widely 
 
 
understood in literature; yet this obligation is neither a pact nor guarantee that things will 
continue smoothly between friends.  We embark on significant friendships in hope that they 
will last forever, but these increased obligations and our difficulty at times in carrying them 
















Chapter 2  Special Obligations 
Life presents us with decisions over how we will carry out a plan of action, what we will 
do with our time, and more specifically what we will choose to do over something else.  We 
should expect to make hard decisions in life about work, where we will live, relationships and 
marriage, etc, so friendships should not be any different.  Just like any other relationship, 
friendship can cause great dissonance and conflict.  We know well the experience of having to 
choose among obligations to different friends, or more seriously, we have felt the burden of 
having chosen sides in an argument between two friends.  When it comes down to making 
these hard decisions we reflect on our obligations and what we hold as our highest priority.    
We commit ourselves to friendships by choice, which results in special obligations that 
we must consider when making plans of action that are both related and unrelated to the 
friendship.  However, we will not always prioritize our friends highly enough to create a 
dilemma of conflicting obligations; we will prioritize other variables in our lives above certain 
friendships.  At the beginning of a casual friendships, we commit for our own sake and focus on 
upholding our obligations to ourselves.  When we move into deeper and more significant 
friendships with people, our primary commitment changes from a commitment to ourselves to 
a primary commitment to the friendship as a whole.  In even deeper and most significant 
friendships, our obligation to the friendship as a whole becomes a lesser priority and our 
priority turns to our obligations to the friend as an individual. At this most significant stage of 
friendship, we place our friend in alignment with the obligation we have to ourselves.  This 
 
 
leads to the possibility that we could favor the obligation to our friend and doing what is best 
for them rather than focusing on what is best for ourselves, and ultimately act on behalf of the 
our obligation to our friend over the obligation to ourselves.  
In this chapter I will focus on how the special obligations are enough reason for a course 
of action in order to support my overall claim that the conflict that comes from special 
obligations is valid. In Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Creates Reason, Diane Jeske 
discusses the belief that the special obligations, which she uses interchangeably with intimate 
relationships, can act as moral reasons for our actions.  Jeske claims that moral reasoning, 
“reasons of intimacy”, are at the foundation of our choice to act in regard to our friends. These 
reasons of intimacy exist on the same premise that our prioritizing people over others is related 
to our level of intimacy with that person.  Friendships are significant components of our lives, 
so we will look at what gives us reason to consider them in taking priority in ethical dilemmas 
of obligations where we must choose between multiple commitments and obligation.  There 
could be several components of friendship that make us feel confident in the justification of our 
actions.  Jeske defends a Voluntarist perspective that special obligations only exist as products 
of chosen commitments; therefore, she claims that friendships are unique in involving special 
obligations.  
Jeske addresses the different reasons for action and which pertain to friendships or 
intimate relationships.  She distinguishes between justification and explanation.  She says: “we 
must distinguish between justificatory and explanatory reasons when deciding the ‘right’ thing to 
 
 
do, focusing on supporting friendship as a justificatory reason,” (Jeske). Jeske gives friendships 
the right to be considered rational reasoning for our actions, as opposed to being strictly an 
explanatory description of an internal state of being.  As she makes the distinction between 
types of reason she also establishes her position that friendships can serve in ethical contexts as 
contributing to the rational measure of reason. 
Since Jeske has now clearly positioned her argument around friendship’s relevance to 
our actions and doing the right thing, she goes further into detail about how friendship pertains 
to actions. She is: “concerned with reasons that agents have for various courses of actions, not 
with whether or when they act on a basis of those actions,” (Jeske 7), and she claims that the 
latter is for psychologists while the former is for philosophers like herself.  Ultimately, we will 
examine the reasons that friends have for acting in regard to each other and how friendship 
may affect this overall condition. 
Jeske elaborates on the different types of reasons on the basis of which we can engage 
and how they pertain to decision making in contexts involving friendship.  She subdivides 
reasons into two greater categories of fundamental and derivative reasons, defining them in this 
way: “Derivative: derived from another reason to do something,” (Jeske 11) and “Fundamental: 
we want to promote intrinsic value, keep our promises, and satisfy our desires,” (Jeske 13).  
Jeske focuses on the fundamental reasons as the means to decision making within the context of 
friendship, since the truest friendship has intrinsic value.  She considers alternate focuses, such 
as Utilitarianism and Consequentialism, which consider most of our reasoning to be derivative 
 
 
and Jeske considers these but ultimately disagrees on the basis that the reasons are too external 
to the friendship.   
Jeske also outlines what she believes to be an intimate relationship and what can be 
considered a rational type of reasoning.  She claims that people involved in friendships must: 1. 
Have a positive attitude toward one another; 2. Have mutual attitudes; 3. Have concern for each 
other that exceeds the concern that they have for others; 4. Desire to spend time together; 5. 
Want to learn about each other more than most; 6. have spent time together; 7. Have a history of 
concern for another (Jeske 47).  These properties of friendship are reasonable in the sense that 
many relationships fit under each category yet still remain special to each individual.  Her basic 
outline of friendship indicates the condition of a true friendship, thus indicating the conditions 
that must appear in a relationship involving special obligations. 
While this outline of the relationships is important, some of the most significant 
information is in her second chapter in Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates 
Reasons, “How Not to Understand Reasons of Intimacy”.  She discusses the different forms of 
justificatory reasons and puts them into categories based on two components: the doer and the 
receiver.  She introduces subjective agent-relative and objective agent-neutral as inappropriate 
contexts to view reasons of intimacy in order to help us understand our beliefs before we start 
to justify them.   
First, Jeske considers the perspective that reasons of intimacy, choosing to do things for 
our friend, are subjective agent-relative.  She uses the Humean account under this category and 
 
 
the belief that: S’s fundamental reason is to satisfy her desires or promote her interests and 
concerns meaning that we do things in lieu of a friend because it benefits us.  She challenges this 
position by claiming that it is not the desire itself that should ground a reason for action but the 
objective value of the pleasure that will arise from fulfilling that desire, and that desires are not 
always rational and therefore cannot be pure sources of reasons for carrying out an action (Jeske 
17-19).  Her argument against desires being rational has to do with the fact that she views 
desires as a derivative reason rather than a fundamental reason for our actions and behavior 
(Jeske 33), thus lacking the intrinsic quality at the foundation of friendship.   
Initially, this may seem to counter Plato’s perspective on desires that I mentioned in the 
first chapter; however, there is a difference.  In this context, desires are extrinsic because they 
act as a function of reason to fulfill any desire, whereas, in Plato, the desire to see each other is 
positive because the desire is specific to this.  Jeske gives an example of desires that would be 
inappropriate to act on: “engage immoral activity (organizing neo-nazis); imprudent desires 
(excessive alcohol consumption); and trivial or superficial desires (getting botox injections),” 
(Jeske 19).  These are all considered irrational desires and differ from the desire to see each other 
that Plato uses as a sign of good friendship.  This desire differs mainly in the sense that it is 
anchored in their desire for the other person, not other outcomes as the others do.  The Humean 
Account considers the friend as agent-relative, which is important because of the ‘special’ 
component of special obligations.  However, that does not compensate for the fact that the 
subjective component detracts from any rational application to reasoning in friendship.  It is not 
a good idea or the right one in a universal context.    
 
 
Jeske looks for support that reasons of intimacy are also fundamental.  In order to do 
this she turns her attention toward the objectivist account and, more specifically the objective 
agent-neutral reasons, which exist in an agent’s awareness of objective value properties rather 
than that of their desires (Jeske 28).  This “Aristotelian view understands reasons of intimacy as 
objective agent-neutral,” (Jeske 31).  The objectivity at the foundation of this perspective justifies 
and then standardizes our reasoning to create a common understanding that exists outside of 
our own personal experiences.  However, the agent-neutral aspect presents a problem in 
relation to our reasons of intimacy as it suggests that these reasons of intimacy could be applied 
to any person.  Our friendships are not accessible with just any one person at any moment but 
are unusual and rare. She says in more detail that: “whatever value my relationships have, 
other relationships of the same type that aren’t my own will have the same value as will 
possible or potential other relationships” (Jeske 43) when considering agent-neutral 
relationships, which goes against her theory of friendships and her belief that special 
obligations cannot be applied to everyone because they would then not be special. 
It is essential that special obligations occur only in relationships with people that are 
irreplaceable and incomparable with others in our lives. The special obligations can only be 
applied to people of this status because they give that person precedence over another in 




Jeske combines subjective agent-relative and objective agent-neutral reasons to describe 
reasons of intimacy in order to maintain the principles under which she argues reasons of 
intimacy occur.  She says: “We should view friendship and promise-making as types of 
commitments as voluntarily undertaken actions that ground objective agent-relative reasons,” 
(Jeske 83).  The agent-relativity suggests that actions cannot be aimed toward just anyone and 
the objective component sheds light on the idea that our reasons of intimacy are rational and 
true.  This type of reason as applicable to her idea that special obligations are rational helps 
suggest that this is a true reason to choose our actions and behavior. 
This claim proposes that reasons of intimacy exist between friends due to the objective 
component and agent-relative component.  The objective part suggests that these reasons must 
be understood by those outside of the friendship, so that there is some form of objective 
validation.  This validation is ultimately to accept the fact that those closer to us will take a 
higher priority in our life.  The agent-relative component proposes that these reasons of 
intimacy cannot apply to just anyone but only to those under the conditions of friendship. 
In Chapter 5, Jeske addresses three different types of Particularism, which she considers 
to be “not itself a theory, but, rather, a family of theses concerning the nature of moral 
knowledge, of moral ontology, and of moral practice,” (Jeske 85).  Particularists ultimately claim 
that there are “no general moral truths, no codifiable moral rules, no necessary connections 
between normative and nonnormative properties and that moral agents ought to make 
decisions by paying attention to particulars rather than by attempting to apply general rules or 
 
 
truths,” (Jeske 85).  This perspective is somewhat subjective and ultimately challenges reasons 
of intimacy, or our special obligations. 
A type of Epistemological Particularism -- Knowledge Acquisition Particularism -- 
works with reasons of intimacy if we consider friendship to be one of Wittengstein’s family 
resemblances.  Paradigm cases of friendship are instances of valuable reason-giving 
relationships; therefore, we can consider friendship as reason-giving and not having a general 
truth to be reason-giving (Jeske 103).  This is not what Jeske necessarily aims for in her 
argument; however, it is a way for rationality to be found in a case where there is no room for 
general truth.  This is consistent with her ideas of friendship because she ultimately claims that 
a set of normative properties cannot be applied to friendships based on the fact that no two 
friendships are the same.  While this theory keeps this in consideration, it does not apply to the 
rational component that Jeske looks for. 
Epistemological Particularism may be one of the greatest counters to Jeske’s take on 
reasons of intimacy and friendship.  It challenges the very reason that she begins this discussion 
on special obligations by claiming that there is no way to be certain about anything.  Such 
ambiguity turns attention away from what could be an explanation of rationality by adapting 
an “it is what it is” attitude and merely accepting situations as they are. This perspective also 
takes away from the significance of Jeske’s argument by suggesting that it is not even an issue 
that can be discussed or solved at any level.  This perspective is an easy way out of what Jeske 
claims to be a frustrating and obligatory commitment to the most important people in our lives.  
 
 
In addition to that, I find it hard to believe that someone who followed this kind of 
Particularism is able to maintain any friendships in its truest form as they are unable to apply 
the necessary qualities to the relationship. 
 In Chapter 6, Jeske investigates the role of constraints in our friendships, relating her 
explication of objective agent-relative reasons as representative of reasons of intimacy and using 
constraints as another level of support in this relationship.  She says that if we “understand 
constraints as objective agent-relative reasons [then it] implies that reasons grounded in an 
agent’s awareness of her own desires (subjective) are not constraints,” (Jeske 108).  She also says 
that: “constraints are meant to indicate objectivity and that reasons are grounded in ‘external’ 
facts that bind us in ways that we can’t alter merely by altering our desires,” (Jeske 109).  Jeske’s 
examples of constraints are clearly understood to be rational at the external extent, and she 
ultimately figures that friendship is a constraint.   
Friendship can act as a constraint in many ways as we often consider our friends in 
moral reasoning and what we want to do.  She considers friendship a true constraint in our 
decision-making of our actions and behaviors, so what will happen when constraints of 
friendship go up against other objective constraints?  Jeske acknowledges that tension and 
conflict come along with these constraints of friendship, but she never says we should live 
without them (Jeske 149).  Ultimately she hopes that addressing the complexity that such 
constraints added to our lives will help lessen the negativity that arises from the tension and 
conflict, since it is now expected to come with friendships. 
 
 
This tension is a result of conflicting obligations between two things to which we have 
obligations.  As discussed in the first chapter, we experience such dissonance when we are 
forced to choose between obligation A and obligation B. Claiming that friendship acts as a 
constraint construes such obligations as a feature of some conflicting obligations, whether on 
can choose either obligation A or B. 
Jeske also explores whether her reasons of intimacy could fall within the theories of 
Consequentialism.  She agrees that “we need to be cautious about appeal to intuitions,” (Jeske 
112) but for reasons that overlap with those of the inability to apply objective agent-neutral 
reasoning to reasons of intimacy, she is unable to completely make the connection.  It seems as 
though she agrees with Elizabeth Anderson in saying that consequentialist reasoning is in 
alignment with what we value as lower goods but that “we need a logic that contrasts with 
consequentialism in order to express higher modes of valuation,” (Jeske 119).  This would be the 
appropriate way to treat people in accordance to their value, as she believes that the 
Consequentialist perspective does not rightfully do so. 
Consequentialism prevents us from ever considering our individual in regard to an 
outcome but rather guides us to consider the outside factor first, which is toxic to significant 
friendships.  This approach closely resembles what Aristotle mentions about consequentialism.  
Francis Kamm argues that treating people correctly is manifested by acting out of respect 
toward them in ways that acknowledge their elevated status as inviolable beings (Jeske 122). He 
emphasizes the value of treating them as being more than a “mere use-value,” which echoes the 
 
 
concept that our treatment of others must extend beyond casual friendships.  Jeske’s support of 
going against the objectivist approach is important in establishing her belief that friendships 
cannot directly apply to just anyone and that they deserve to have special consideration in our 
lives. 
Jeske’s most important material is in Chapter 7, “the Scope of the Objective Agent-
Relative,” where she explicates the concept of this further.  She states her position on 
Voluntarism: “the only way to acquire special obligations-i.e. agent-relative obligations- is 
through some voluntary action(s) such that we know or ought to know that such action(s) 
constitutes the assumption of such obligations,” (Jeske 127).  The main focus of Voluntarism is 
choice; we choose to commit ourselves to relationships that bring about obligations.  This choice 
makes them special in comparison to other relationships that we do not choose to have.  Family 
and political relationships are left out of the special obligation category because of the fact that 
we do not have choice in what family or what political system we are born into.  
The anti-voluntarist intuition argues that we have special obligations to our family 
members and society as a whole even though we do not technically choose to commit ourselves 
to either of them.  While we are often tempted to consider relationships of non-choice, such as 
those to family or government, as special, Jeske argues that we need to put aside these natural 
anti-voluntarist intuitions and opt for understanding our reasons to benefit family members, 
fellow citizens, those who have done good for us in objective agent-neutral or subjective agent-
relative forms (Jeske 127).  Such relationships still fall into the categories that Jeske lists, 
 
 
however, the reason category is not the category she argues friendship falls under but rather 
that friendship falls under reasons of intimacy.  Jeske works inside-out in making sure that her 
readers understand every component of her argument.  She says: “we believe ourselves to have 
reasons to care for our intimates- friends, family members, colleagues, lovers- [and] that we do 
not have to care for persons who are not our intimates,” (Jeske 1).  Throughout her book, she 
addresses the differences between reasons of intimacy and those of the acquaintance, stranger, 
or people whom we do not choose to have in our lives.  In the end, she explains her reasoning 
very simply: “One of the reasons we choose to do things is because of our intimate 
relationships” (Jeske 1) as ethically understood and rationally thought. 
 She acknowledges that the relationships we invest in and prioritize above others are not 
objectively supported for their own sake but supported because they bring us to objective 
greatness.  She explains: “it is often the desires that aren’t always in line with objective value 
that make our lives peculiarly rich, satisfying, and, in the end, objectively valuable,” (Jeske 149).  
Our friendships bring value into our lives that would not exist without them; we can ultimately 
agree that said value is objectively good.  With these come special obligations that, though 
taxing and capable of complicating any otherwise objectively simpler situation, we must accept 
for the sake of the relationship and what it brings us.  Jeske advocates that in order “to get all of 
the objective values, we must simultaneously create relationships that generate reasons that 
compete with those generated by objective value,” (Jeske 149).  This has somewhat of an ironic 
twist as it suggests that the subjectivity or agent-relative component of friendships is essentially 
an objective truth.  Ultimately, we can see rational and moral reasoning in investing time in 
 
 
friendships because of these objective outcomes.  Because we agree and understand these terms 
we must also accept the special obligations that we commit to because they are what will 
















Chapter 3  Conflicted Friendships 
 Despite the fact that friends provide support, intimacy, and unique experiences for each 
other, there are many ways that friends also create situations of dissonance.  Whether we have 
to decide between doing a requested favor for a friend and going to the gym or are involved in 
a more serious conflict between two people, we can encounter situations in which we frequently 
confront and react to these points of dissonance.  When life presents us with situations where 
we have to measure outcomes against other outcomes, we are forced to measure our friend 
against something else.  Thus we can predict that situations involving our “casual friends” 
cause less dissonance than situations involving “significant friends”. 
 Our friends can be at the root of dissonance in two ways: first, in an indirect manner and 
secondly, in a direct manner.  Situations that indirectly involve friends are situations that the 
friend is not necessarily aware of; for instance, a situation in which we might have to choose 
between helping a friend and helping a family member.  Situations that directly involve friends 
are situations that the friend is aware of and actively involved in; for instance, an argument 
between two friends and the choice of a third mutual friend in handling it.   
 I have spent time discussing the various degrees of friendship and how our obligations 
shift from casual to significant friendships.  I suggest that significant friendships act as the 
truest form of friendship in the sense that we have special obligations to solely the friend as 
they are our primary concern in that relationship.  I also believe that special obligations – as 
Derrida affirms -- add a risky component to friendship as they have the potential to jeopardize a 
 
 
relationship if what is best for the friend is prioritized above what is best for the friendship.  
This enables me to conclude that, in times of dissonance, we may end up losing our truest 
friends if what is better for our friend is not better for us.   
Chapters 1 and 2 support the motive of my third chapter, which is to discuss the times of 
conflict, tension, and dissonance that generate danger in friendships.  How do we handle these 
situations and make the right, or best, choice?  We all come across situations when we do not 
know how to act in regard to our friendships, but is there one best way that to determine how 
we should make a decision on whether or not to honor the friendship and follow through with 
the special obligations?  I argue that, ultimately, we must pay attention to the reasoning behind 
our decision in order to determine what is right for us by figuring out how our decision will 
lead to the life we are creating that we want to lead.   
The obligations to our friends collide with obligations to society, others, and the self, 
which creates a gradation in degree of conflict and dissonance.  I have come to discover that it is 
these special obligations that pose great risk at the basis of friendships.  They can conflict with 
any other obligation we have, creating a situation in which we do not know which obligation 
we should act on first.  In this next chapter, I will break down the interactions we could have 
with our friends and what kinds of situations could create great conflict. 
 As I examine the existence of conflict amongst friends in regard to obligations we have, 
some people may disagree that this is a problem at all.  I frequently hear someone discussing 
their friendships, claiming that they have never gotten into a fight with their best friend.  These 
 
 
various people may see themselves as an exception to my rule, finding my theory inapplicable 
to their friendship.  Certain situations between friends create dissonance when friends are 
directly involved, even when friendships have previously been free of conflict; thus I would like 
to discount this form of “perfect friendship”.  Even if they had not encountered a situation of 
conflict, they have had, almost certainly, to choose between doing something for that friend or 
for another, thus experiencing a form of dissonance I will discuss as occurring when the friend 
is indirectly involved. 
 There are also people who may claim that they do not have trouble choosing between 
their friend and other obligations.  There are only two possible reasons as to why such ease 
might occur. One may be that the friend is not considered the most important obligation, which 
would reflect a more casual friendship.  The other reason is that one might always choose the 
friend as most important without second thoughts.  The person who does this prioritizes their 
friend first and could claim that they do not fit the scenarios of dissonance that I present; 
however, they would not then be able to say the same thing about another friend.  Surely, they 
would not choose another friend over the one that they “always prioritize first”.  Ultimately, it 
is likely that everyone experiences some form of dissonance when dealing with friendships and 
other obligations whether they directly involve the friend or not.  
 As I already mentioned, there are various forms of situations that present dissonance 
pertaining to a friendship: where the friend is either indirectly or directly involved.  We can 
look at the source of dissonance as well.  Sometimes the dissonance is created when a friend is 
 
 
measured up against obligations to variables outside of that friendship, such as social demands 
or other intimate relationships.  In these situations, friends can be both directly or indirectly 
related to these scenarios.  For example, when I agree to drive a friend to the airport but then 
my closer friend calls me saying that they need me to take them to the bus station because their 
ride cancelled, my closer friend is now an indirect source of dissonance that I experience.  In this 
scenario, my friend may not necessarily be aware of my, now present, task of choosing what to 
do.  My closer friend is also indirectly involved in such dissonance because that request would 
not have created such tension if my schedule had been open; she herself did not directly create 
the tension.  In handling this situation, Jeske would claim that reasons of intimacy are all we 
need to determine what we should do; the context of each outcome is not as important.  
 A friend can also be the direct source of dissonance that is brought on by situations 
provided by influences outside of a friendship.  This could occur when my friend realizes the 
position that they indirectly put me in.  If my close friend asks for a ride after I already agreed 
to help another friend and they realize the position that they put me in, then they become 
directly involved. At this stage, greater tension is created in the decision process because our 
friend is aware of the decision that I need to make. 
 This form of dissonance is somewhat lessened because our closer friends have a special 
obligation to us as a significant friend and they should therefore want to do good for us as well.  
They should want to back down and suggest a way to solve the situation so that they and their 
friend benefit.  For instance, my friend should look for other people who might provide the 
 
 
ride. Even though I may feel badly that I could not be the one to help, I will not be putting her 
in a bad position. 
The greater dissonance that could be destructive to a friendship occurs when the friend 
becomes a direct source of tension and our obligations no longer correspond.  These situations 
occur during times of conflict primarily between two close friends, either during an argument, a 
disagreement, or a clash of obligations; it could be any situation that threatens the friendship in 
cases where neither friend is happy with the current situation.  This differs from situations 
involving outside influences in the sense that these will only ever directly relate the friend to the 
tension we experience in making a choice. 
 When we fight with our friends, every step is a choice even though they may be 
unconscious or reflexive.  If a fight gets stretched out over several hours or days, then we 
deliberate over when we will say something or what we will say.  If we feel that our friend has 
wronged us in some way, then we put careful thought into how we will treat them and when 
we will forgive them and move forward.  This kind of scenario involving ongoing dissonance is 
the severest degree of tension that we may experience in regard to our friends because what we 
choose to do will influence the future of our relationship with that friend. 
In the first chapter, I concluded that our obligations in our most significant friendships 
are directed toward the friend for the friend’s sake.  These obligations and our commitment to 
our friends are challenged when we are in the midst of conflict with a close friend.  There could 
be outside factors that help us determine what we will do, but ultimately, we are forced to 
 
 
decide between doing what is best for us and what is best for our close friend.  Regarding the 
conclusion that the strongest friendship means that our obligation to that friend is a higher 
priority than to that of a friendship, we can see how we would be in a great conflict over which 
obligation to act on.  In this case, a friend’s direct involvement could mean more dissonance. 
Before going into more details about this concept, I will first discuss the minimum 
impact that obligations could have on a friendship in order to display the gradation of 
obligation that exists.  First, we must acknowledge that there is a situation in which tension 
would not be a problem when we have two different obligations to consider: when what is right 
for me is also right for my friend.  In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses a mutual agreement 
on ending friendship: “if one partner were to remain mentally a child, while the other has 
grown to be a man in the best sense of the word, how could they still be friends, when they 
neither like nor feel joy and pain at the same things?” (Aristotle 251). Outgrowing our friends or 
vice versa is always a risk we take in investing in relationships.  While we have obligations to 
those significant friends, we also may be in completely different points in our lives where the 
burdens of the friendship outweigh the good of the friendship.  We may reach a point where we 
clash and no longer have shared experiences or understandings, as Aristotle suggests. If our 
friend has outgrown us, then is it our obligation to let them go and move on if we are holding 
them back, or is it their obligation to us to make it work?  Each of us has those obligations to 
each other in considering the significance of the friendship; however, they could conflict with 
each other and with the obligations to ourselves. In Aristotle’s example, we don’t know the 
details behind the conflict and whether or not obligations conflict at all.  If we are unable to 
 
 
meet halfway in such situations, then it is at times of such conflicting obligations where the 
future of our friendship is at great risk.  While obligations can conflict, it is not always given 
that they will.   
In The Philosophy of Friendship, Mark Vernon discusses Nietzsche's conception of star 
friendships, which is a positive outlook on the breaking off of friendships: “we were friends and 
have become estranged…the almighty force of our tasks drove us apart again into different seas 
and sunny zone, and perhaps we shall never see each other again…Let us then believe in our star 
friendship even if we should be compelled to be earth enemies,” (Nietzsche, Vernon, 70).  
Nietzsche presents estrangement as a mutual state where both friends may have outgrown each 
other and do not work together anymore.  Unlike Aristotle’s example, Nietzsche presents a 
situation in which the right thing to do is end the friendship because it would be best for both 
parties.  Yet we preserve a sense of “star friendship” when we have become “earth enemies.” 
Here our obligations to ourselves and our friends in ending the friendship do not conflict 
because what is best for my friend is also best for myself. 
Not only is the same thing best for both parties in ending the friendship, but each friend 
can also recognize that the friendship was good at a certain time and is no more. Aristotle 
agrees that upon a broken friendship, we can reach a state of reconciliation in which we have an 
obligation to honor the past relationship: “we should remember our past familiarity with him, 
and just as we feel more obliged to do favors for friends than for strangers, we must show some 
consideration to him for old friendship’s sake, provided it was not excessive wickedness on his 
 
 
part that broke the friendship,” (Aristotle, 252).  Paying homage to the friendship validates the 
truth that it once held but also recognizes the fact that it is no longer a vital friendship for the 
people who were involved.  It is understandable that people would not think about something 
as much if irrelevant to their lives; however, this is not the same as someone entirely forgetting 
a past significant friendship.  It is important to remember such relationships because these past 
relationships had a meaningful position in our lives.  Vernon agrees with this perspective as he 
believes that we are capable of ending a friendship on good terms and furthermore that we can 
learn and grow from them in a way that we could not have if they had not existed: “Past 
friendships should lend themselves to future graciousness, for, even if it was a gift wrapped in 
thorns or conversely less of a gift than it first seemed, friendship brought a gift nonetheless. For 
that it is remembered,” (Vernon 71).  Vernon’s state may only be possible among the most 
significant of friends, despite the fact that they did not continue being friends.  Ultimately, 
people that can end their friendship on such a note are two people who can look back and agree 
on everything that went right and everything that went wrong, which takes energy that most 
people might not expend in casual friendships. 
Thus far we have looked at tension and dissonance that can be created within 
friendships where the friend is indirectly involved.  Such scenarios show that our obligations to 
ourselves and our friends may align and lead to a clean ending between friends if forced to 




Now, I address the situations that force us to face conflicting obligations to ourselves 
and our friend.  These situations present the greatest tension between two friends and what we 
decide to do.  We have an obligation to stay true to ourselves and fight for what we think is best 
for ourselves.  If what is best for us is to fight for our friend to stay in our lives because we need 
them even though they have outgrown us, then it becomes a daunting task to determine what 
obligation to follow.  In this situation we do more than recognize the obligation we have to 
ourselves to do what is in our favor, but we also must decide whether or not to act on those 
obligations.  Consider that I outgrow someone whom I had considered a best friend and who 
had considered me a best friend in return.  We had seen problems developing between us for a 
long time and decided to work through them from the obligation we had to each other as 
significant friends.  Eventually when I realize that our friendship is no longer mutual and that 
they need me more than I need them, I must choose whether to continue the relationship for the 
sake of the friend or to exit the friendship for my own sake.  
For those of us raised in the United States, we have grown up in an individualistic 
society that focuses on the individual and self.  We are taught to look out for ourselves and 
achieve personal accomplishments as one of our main priorities.  Of course, not everyone in the 
United States is entirely egocentric, however, we are likely to experience a greater focus on the 
self in this society.  We are taught to love ourselves, which may act as the source for this natural 
urge for us to look out for ourselves.  However, we must also hold our closest friends as high 
priorities in our lives even though our commitment and obligations to them are often what 
 
 
conflict with the obligations we have to ourselves.  So how do we choose whether to follow 
through with our obligations to ourselves or our friend in times of conflict? 
 Based on the conclusion of my second chapter, our special obligations to our friends are 
a source of moral reasoning for us to rely on; we do things for our friends for their own sake at a 
significant level of friendship merely because we have an intimate relationship with them.  
While putting our friends first may originally appear to be a selfless approach to friendship, 
there are philosophers who argue that it is completely selfish.  In Love, Friendship, and the Self, 
Bennett Helm examines the view that our reasoning behind prioritizing our close friends is not 
actually for our friend’s own good but for our own good.  He says: “one’s identity as this person 
is fundamentally a matter of the kind of life worth one’s living, and that this is determined 
largely by one’s personal values and priorities; after all, we tend to answer questions about who 
we are by specifying what we stand for, what is fundamentally important in our lives,” (Helm 
130).  Our significant friendships are fundamentally important in our lives, which can be seen 
through the kind of tension that they can instigate.  This perspective suggests that while we 
may be sincerely interested in doing what is best for our friend, we ultimately make decisions in 
regard to the life that we want to live.  From this implication, we can assume that as long as our 
friend is still something we want in our life then we will continue to follow through with our 
obligation to them.  However, if we decide that we no longer want them in our lives, then we 
will do what is best for ourselves and forgo the special obligations we have for our friend.  This 




My first reaction to this concept was to reject it because it ultimately seems to reflect 
poorly on friendships overall, portraying the institution of friendship as ultimately egoistical.  
Could it be that in choosing to follow through with our obligations to our closest friends, we are 
ultimately also doing what is best for ourselves?  When you are that close with someone, what 
makes one happy will often also make the other friend happy.  It is from this basis that the 
egoist perspective claims that we could be making decisions in terms of ourselves until what 
our friend needs is no longer what we want and we decide to weigh our independent desires 
more heavily.  Helm explicates on how this can unintentionally occur through the process of 
confusing what we want strictly for our friend and what we want for ourselves.  He says:  
If in valuing something I thereby come to identify myself with it, such valuing, 
such identification, cannot ignore the potential unity that makes this be me. That 
is, for me to identify myself with something by valuing it, that thing must come 
to have a place within my identity as this particular person, so that we cannot 
understand such identification apart from the larger whole of the person’s 
identity that identification presupposes.” (Helm 121). 
This perspective suggests that the reasoning behind our actions involving our friend is no 
longer a reflection of that friendship but merely what is best for us.  This blurs the line between 
whom we make our decision for, ultimately enabling us to trick ourselves into thinking that we 
are acting for the sake of our friend when we are actually doing it for our own good.   
He describes how this process of identification with self could come to exist: “to identify 
with something is to value it by bringing it into your evaluative perspective as a part of the kind 
of life worth your living, potentially as the result of the exercise of your autonomy and practical 
reason,” (Helm 134).  This could be a very dangerous component to a friendship in the sense 
 
 
that it could reflect only a burning desire to please ourselves, so much that we only hold onto 
friendships when they conveniently appease our desires. 
 We could settle with this somewhat depressing conclusion that our truest forms of 
friendship turn out to be about ourselves, but I will not settle with this concept because this is 
not friendship.  The egoist perspective is accurate in that the truest form of friendship does have 
an overlap of whose good is being acted on; however, it is not for purely selfish reasons.  The 
egoist perspective leaves out two key components of friendship that refute the claim that it is 
only a selfish act.  First, the egoist fails to acknowledge that the overlap occurs because our 
truest friends become an extension of ourselves.  We can see this as the case when we prioritize 
significant friends in alignment with ourselves.  We put them on the same level as ourselves; 
just as we would change things about ourselves and try to eliminate certain characteristics from 
our lives because we do not like them, we will do the same with close friends.  Ultimately, we 
prioritize our closest friends alongside our strongest commitment which is ourselves.   
Secondly, the egoist perspective ignores the concept of intimacy.  We grow attached to 
people, which enables us to consider them so close; this is the whole point of Jeske’s reasons of 
intimacy.  This cannot be entirely out of selfishness because everything we experience will not 
be perfect.  Knowing how much love you can feel for someone may also indicate how much 
pain you can feel from that same person; ultimately, this reveals the strength of that friendship 
in our lives. Helm presents the egoist perspective in his book but ultimately identifies 
friendships as containing a love that excludes friendship from an egoist account.  He says: “To 
 
 
love someone is to be intimately concerned for his well-being as this particular person. Such 
intimate concern I have cashed out in terms of intimate identification: having concern for his 
identity understood in terms of the sharing of his cares and values for his sake, that is 
analogous to, but not identical with, your concern for your own identity,” (Helm 172).  The 
egoist perspective differs from this because it neglects intimacy as an active component to the 
friendship.  Without intimacy, we would find ourselves in a friendship for what we get out of it 
and our obligations would never cross over to what is only best for them. 
 My friend and I are two separate entities, but we often make the mistake of considering 
this distinctness as one unit.  In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says: “Since a good man has every 
one of these sentiments toward himself, and since he has the same attitude toward his friend as 
he does toward himself, for his friend really is another self, therefore friendship, too, is 
regarded as being one or other of those sentiments, and those who harbor them are regarded as 
friends,” (Aristotle 253).  He originates this perspective, as already mentioned, and is argued 
against by egoists or other philosophers leaning in that direction.  However, Aristotle is not the 
only person to have said that such a thing exists between true friends.  Emerson says; “I must 
feel pride in my friend’s accomplishments as if they were mine,” (Emerson).  Here he looks at 
the merger of two people and how we are so able to empathize with our friends, experiencing 
their feelings as our own. 
 This level of intimacy may also act as a catalyst to create situations where what is 
directly best for us is also indirectly best for our friend because it is good for us, or the person 
 
 
with whom they are intimate.  If a parent told her child that she would do something for her but 
instead chooses to take a nap, she is then upholding the obligation to herself by going to sleep, 
yet also upholding her obligation of doing what is ultimately best for her child.  If she did not 
take that nap, then she would not be rested or in a calm mood, and would be more likely to 
bring negativity into the child’s life. 
 Ultimately, intimacy enables us to consider people as close friends and encourages us to 
make sacrifices for our friends because of their value to us.  One could argue that this process 
still yields a positive result by making us look like a good friend or a good person in general, 
but there is more than that because we owe more to our friends because of the role they play in 
our lives as our second halves. 
 Obligations to our friends and to ourselves overlap so easily because friends define who 
we are.  While the egoists are correct in saying that we identify with them as part of ourselves, 
we also interact with them in a greater society and have experiences with them that we would 
not have on our own.  And while, metaphorically, our closest friends may be an extension of 
ourselves, we are actually still two separate people with two different perspectives.  In a prior 
paper I wrote: “Friendship reveals the most accurate definition of a person because it is with 
friends that one’s thoughts remain closest to their original form,” (Myavec 5).  Our friends offer 
us more than what we have on our own.  While there is value in growing together, there is also 





 We have been conditioned to look at friendship as a positive addition to our lives 
because we choose it, yet true friendship gives rise to special obligations that challenge more 
universal conceptions of our relationships to others and as such can be seen to act against 
ethical regard to others as human beings.  These special obligations lead us to prioritize our 
friends over non friends and our more intimate relationships over our less intimate 
relationships.  In doing so, we challenge universal conceptions of relationships to others.  
Utilitarianism says that we should act in accordance to what will maximize overall happiness, 
and deontological ethics claims that we should follow a universal set of rules in determining 
our actions.  Special obligations allow us to focus on and single out an individual just because 
we are close with them, which conflicts with theories of universal obligation.   
 In this thesis, I have argued that friendship poses particularly insoluble problems of 
special obligation, not just because they can conflict with obligations we have to others, but 
because it can also challenge obligations we have to ourselves or to a conception of life that we 
hold precious.  Just as we have obligations to others, we have obligations to ourselves, which 
may ultimately be more important than many of our obligations to other people as we are the 
leading character in our lives.  We may reach what could be the greatest dissonance and 
internal conflict when the obligations to ourselves conflict with the obligations we have to 
others.   
 
 
Ultimately, we will have to choose whether or not to uphold the obligation we have to 
ourselves and act for our own good, or uphold the obligation we have as a good friend to that 
friend.  The decision we make in choosing which obligation to uphold is made in accordance to 
what is best for ourselves in the life we want to live; each choice a brushstroke on the painting 
that we create of the life we seek for ourselves. 
 The Egoistic perspective challenges this component of friendship, claiming that it is a 
selfish act as we only remain true friends with someone until it is no longer convenient and the 
dissonance becomes too much to bear.  Even though we ultimately make the choice in regard to 
what is best for our lives, we are not committing a completely selfish act.  First, we are not being 
selfish if what is best for ourselves is also best for the world around us and those intimate 
relationships in which we are involved.  Secondly, we may still choose to uphold our obligation 
to our friend and sacrifice what is best for ourselves but this should not be seen as a sign of 
selfishness but a sign of strength in the friendship.   
The internal conflict we experience is a sign of the level of priority that we have placed 
on our friend as we have put them in alignment with ourselves, our highest priority.  The 
dissonance represents the struggle and tear we feel because we put them so close to us.  This 
closeness suggests a near fusion between two people where they grow as close to one unit as 
possible.  Friends at this level are still separate enough to contribute outside perspectives and 
experiences to relationship and the other person, ultimately, making them something they 
could not be on their own.  Yet such closeness, as this argument has attempted to demonstrate, 
 
 
can bring great risk and danger to both the individuals in the friendship and to the friendship 
itself. Ultimately the paradox of friendship is that the most significant friendships coincide with 
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